STAR: SECRET SHARING FOR THRESHOLD AGGREGATION REPORTING

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$k = 2$



Sometimes known as k-heavy-hitters

THRESHOLD AGGREGATION



Ideal case: No efficient solutions



N-server aggregation: DPFs, Prio, SMPC



Approximate: DP, randomised resp.



Trusted shuffling: e.g. Prochlo

PREVIOUS WORK



- Emphasis on simplicity and performance
- Well-known cryptography (secret sharing, OPRFs)
- Orders of magnitude cheaper than state-of-the-art
- Malicious security
- Auxiliary data support
- Open-source rust code: github.com/brave/sta-rs

OVERVIEW OF STAR



Shamir secret sharing



Anonymizing proxy (such as Tor, or Oblivious HTTP)



Oblivious PRF

c = Enc(ek,m)

Symmetric encryption

CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS



THE STAR PROTOCOL

Randomness phase



Message phase

- (r_1, r_2, r_3) = H(PRF(sk,x))
- **s** = Share(secret=r_1;randomness=r_2), **t** = r_3
- ek = Derive(r_1)
- **c** = Enc(ek,m=(x,aux))

RANDOMNESS & MESSAGE PHASES

Aggregation phase

Steps

- Group messages based on deterministic tag **t**
- If $\geq$ **k** messages in the group, run share recovery on **s** and retrieve $\mathbf{r}_1$
- Derive **ek** from $\mathbf{r}_1$
- Decrypt each **c** to learn (**x**,aux)

Malicious security in random oracle model



Problem: Deterministic tags
Solution: Randomness server key rotations



Problem: Randomness DoS
Solution: Clients can verify randomness (VOPRF)



Problem: Sybil attacks
Solution: All threshold aggregation schemes vulnerable



Problem: Client identity
Solution: Proxy messages, e.g. via Tor, or via randomness server using Oblivious HTTP

SECURITY & LEAKAGE

Aggregation runtimes ($k \in \{0.01\%, 0.1\%, 1\%\}$)







Other costs (per-client)

- **Communication:**
  - Aggregation: 233 bytes (+ auxiliary data)
  - Randomness server: 165 bytes
- **VOPRF:** < 2ms
- **OHTTP:** < 1ms, and approx. 4x communication

PERFORMANCE (256-BIT MEASUREMENTS)

Features

Feature	STAR	Poplar (S&P'21)
Aggregation servers (#)	1	2
Auxiliary data	✓	✗
Leakage	Tag-based	Prefix-based
Identity-hiding	✓ (OHTTP)	✓
Cryptography	Secret-sharing, VOPRFs	Distributed point functions

Headlines (including OHTTP)

- Computation: **1773x** faster
- Bandwidth: **62.4x** smaller
- Financial: **24x** cheaper[1]

[1] AWS c4.8xlarge, Feb 2022 prices

COMPARISON (STAR & POPLAR)

- Simple, Cheap Privacy-Preserving Threshold Aggregation with **k**-anonymity

- Implementations:
  - github.com/brave/sta-rs (Rust)
  - github.com/chris-wood/star-go (Go)

- IETF standardization: draft-dss-star-02

- Used at Brave for Web Discovery Project

CONCLUSIONS & ONGOING WORK